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ABSTRACT
This thesis develops a comparative evaluation method for computer security risk
management methodologies and tools. The subjective biases inherent to current comparison
practices are reduced by measuring unique characteristics of computer security risk
management methodologies. Standardized criteria are established and described by attributes
which in turn are defined by metrics that measure the characteristics. The suitability of a
method or tool to a particular organizational situation can then be analyzed objectively.
Additionally, our evaluation method facilitates the comparison of methodologies and tools to
each other. As a demonstration of its effectiveness, our method is applied to four distinct risk
management methodologies and four risk management tools. Alternative models for utilizing
the evaluation method are presented as well as possible directions for their application.
Without an adequate means of comparin 6 and evaluating risk management decision-
making methodologies, the metadecision (the selection of a risk management method or tool)
becomes arbitrary and capricious, thereby making an inappropriate selection more likely.
Selection of an inappropriate method or tool could lead to excessive costs, misdirected efforts,
and the loss of assets. The system ticnd standard comparison method developed in this
thesis resolves that problem. ''.,-L 1zz ) /
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As the use of computers progressed in the early stages of the technology's development,
the requirement for security was recognized but was not an overriding concern because
systems were centralized and access was limited to Automated Data Processing (ADP)
personnel. Security became a program of ensuring that the personnel were trustworthy and
that sufficient backup of the data was located at a separate site.
As ADP systems became decentralized and the breadth of the information stored in the
systems expanded, the need for a more thorough risk management program was evident. The
concept of risk management was recognized as an integral part of computer security but the
process of risk management lacked the sophistication of an effective tool (Glaseman, 1977,
pp.10 5 -111). The most comprehensive approach prior to 1979 was the application of
checklists.
By October 1979, significant research efforts had been expended to develop the first
broad-based method for evaluating a system's risks -Federal Information Processing Standard
Publication (FIPS PUB) 65 of the National Bureau of Standards (NBS). The method was
intended to quantify the risk analysis procedure to provide management with appropriate
information to make cost effective decisions regarding safeguards (National Bureau of
Standards, 1979). In the absence of any other federal guidelines, the annual loss expectancy
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(or expected value) approach in FIPS PUB 65 became the de facto standard for conducting
a computer security risk analysis for most federal agencies.
Although FIPS PUB 65 went a long way to establishing a quantitative approach for risk
analysis, it had a number of inadequacies. First, it was oriented to large, centralized systems
and did not accommodate the dispersion of data or processing. Second, the method was
subjective in its application of asset valuation, threat likelihood, and occurrence impact; this
introduced inconsistencies into the method. Third, the application of the procedure was
disproportionately costly in terms of time and manpower. Despite these inadequacies, FIPS
PUB 65 and its expected value approach to risk analysis for computer security is still used
by a large number of organizations.
In January 1985, the Air Force Computer Security Program Office hosted a conference
that was attended by many federal agencies that were involved in deveioping alternative risk
analysis procedures. The topics addressed at the conference were similiar to those discussed
in other non-governmental forums such es the Society for Risk Analysis, an international
organization of risk analysis professionals from a variety of disciplines. One result of the
conference was that the NBS and the National Computer Security Center (NCSC) agreed to
assume a joint leadership role in developing and refining risk management practices. Among
other decisions, NBS and NCSC established long-range plans for improving risk management
practices for the federal government. These plans entailed developing and validating a
framework for risk management, developing new risk management procedures, and developing
metrics for the evaluation of those procedures. Each of these goals will be discussed briefly.
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1. The Framework
By 1988, NBS and NCSC had organized what was to become an annual
conference referred to as the Cor,--Juter Security Risk Model Builders Workshop. The central
theme for the conference was the modification and enhancement of a busic framework for risk
management. The model was based on a concept first proposed by Stuart Katzke, Chief of
the Comput, Security Division of NBS, at the 1985 Air Force conference. His "strawman"
included a description of the elements associated with risk management as well as the
beginnings of the relationships between them. (Mayerfeld, 1989)
The goal was to refine the framework into an understandable and all-encompassing
structure that would "dentify all the elements of the risk management process and define the
functional relationships between those elements. This framework would then be used to
validate a particular risk assessment model or categorize different models.
2. New Risk Management Procedures
Although the work on the frame,vork remains incomplete, there is a compelling
requirement to assess the risks to a computer system; for federal agencies, Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) Circulars specifically require q periodic risk analysis be
conducted. Even without federal directives, common sense dictates a carefully structured
approach to examining risk exposure for federal, commercial, non-profit, and private entities
alike.
Associated with an examination of an organization's risk exposure might be an
enormous cost in time and effort, especially if the risk analyses were conducted manually.
In essence, the cost could conceivably exceed the benefit of the results. Consequently, several
3
federal agencies and commercial organizations have developed automated programs to conduct
risk analysis, in hopes of reducing the cost and effort required.
3. Evaluation Metrics
With the proliferation of automated products available for computer security risk
analysis, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST, formerly NBS) and the
NCSC cooperatively sponsored the Risk Management Research Laboratory to provide
facilities to examine and compare the various products. However, the evaluation and
comparison of the above products is influenced by the evaluator's personal biases because of
the lack of a systematic and standard comparison criteria. Lance Hoffman noted at the 1986
National Computer Security Conference:
One significant lack today is metrics for risk analysis and risk management. There is
no currently accepted set of criteria against which all methods can be compared. It is
difficult to evaluate or to convey the advantages and disadvantages of a given
methodology or tool when no accepted evaluation metric exists. (Hoffman, 1986,
p.15 7)
The third long-range goal of the 1988 conference was targeted at that situation.
To date, no known effort has been directed toward the development of metrics for the
evaluation of risk analysis and risk management methods and the wide variety of automated
tools for computer security (Pinsky, 1989).
B. THESIS PURPOSE AND APPROACH
1. Purpose
Risk analysis criteria have not been given as much attention as the risk
management framework or automated tools. They are a vital component of the selection of
any risk management procedure. Without the means of comparing or evaluating decision-
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making methodologies, the metadecision (the decision of which method to use to make a
decision) becomes arbitrary and capricious. The selection of an inappropriate method or tool
could lead to excessive costs, misdirected effort, and the loss of assets. Excessive costs could
result from the selection of a more expensive safeguard than is actually necessary, or from
misdirected effort. The ultimate impact of an inappropriate decision could manifest itself in
the loss of assets. Intuitively, the use of the wrong methodology could be worse than not
performing risk management at all. Metrics could provide the means by which a framework,
procedure, or tool is measured for suitability, and standardize the evaluation process of
determining the most appropriate methodology for a given situation. Referring to the Katzke
framework under modification and enhancement, Browne writes:
One of the missing elements of the Framework is an exposition of the criteria that a
user organization or a methodology developer needs to know in order to create,
enhance, or evaluate a methodology or methodological tool.
Given a purpose and an objective for risk assessment, a government agency or
commercial organization should have a criteria list so that a variety of methodologies
can be evaluated. For example, issues of: breadth of analysis, depth of analysis, cost
of analysis, precision of results, reputability [sic], and materiality need to be explicit.
and can form the basis for an evaluation of a given methodology. Different situations
will call for different solutions. The trade-offs need to be known.
The developers and vendors of risk management methodologies can use the same
criteria to position their offerings and provide solutions that meet the needs of their
client base. (Browne, 1989, pp.14 -15)
The objective of this thesis is to examine existing computer security risk
management methodologies, thereby categorizing their strengths and weaknesses. The
ultimate purpose is to establish a standardized set of metrics that can be used to evaluate risk
management methodologies and tools for their suitability to a particular organizational
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situation. This objective includes several intermediate goals which will be accomplished in
three phases:
" Design and develop metrics for the establishment of evaluation benchmarks for risk
analysis and risk management methods.
" Apply the benchmarks developed above to compare and correlate methods.
* Apply the benchmarks to compare and correlate manual or automated risk analysis
tools.
2. Approach
The need for acceptable computer security risk mana tent practices is becoming
more evident throughout the federal and commercial environment because of the
sophistication and complexity of today's technology and the increased value society has
placed on information. Present methodologies, although suitable for some situations, have lost
their appeal for several reasons.
The first and probably the most prevalent vocalized complaint is the amount of
time required to complete a thorough risk analysis. When a computer system of substantial
complexity is involved, teams of several people can spend months just for the risk assessment
alone. Considering the entire process to be iterative, a thorough assessment could become
disproportionately expensive in comparison to the cost of a periodic loss to the system.
The next problem often expressed is the lack of confidence in the probabilities
available for the likelihood of threat events. This lack of confidence is derived mostly from
the inherent problems of understanding probability and the methods available for producing
those probabilities. For instance, it is difficult for an analyst to discriminate between the
probabilities of .15 and .20 for the occurrance of an event. Also, an analyst may have a
6
difficult time conceptualizing a probability of 10"9. Because computer technology is so young
in comparison to other, more mature technologies, an established data base from which to
develop historical probabilities is not available.
Another common complaint of present methods is the inability to combine
qualitative and quantitative information. This particular problem permeates throughout all risk
management procedures as well as throughout any particular procedure itself. For instance,
an analyst can survey the stakeholders and owners of data to determine the value of that data.
However, because of the nature of data, its value would most likely be expressed in
qualitative terms rather than quantitative terms (such as dollars). A specific example is the
value placed on classified data by federal agencies. It is expressed in terms of the level of
protection required (National Computer Security Center, 1985). Although this may be suitable
for the analyst's purposes initially, he eventually must combine it with the other values from
an assessment. Consequently, practitioners of computer security require a methodology that
resolves these problems.
Initially, our approach to this task was to compare risk management methodologies
of other, more mature technologies and evaluate their techniques of dealing with the valuation
of assets, determination of likelihood, and the impact significance. For instance, the insurance
industry routinely places a monetary value on irreplaceable assets (such as people). Civil
engineers effectively accomplish significant undertakings because they have standardized
thresholds of acceptable risk. Additionally, the nuclear power industry exists, despite an
extremely low threshold of acceptable risk in that industry. We had hoped to draw from the
strengths of these technologies and apply their special capabilities to risk management for
computer security.
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Although logically, this seemed like an appropriate technique for the development
of a new methodology, we immediately discovered an impasse - a lack of a technique to
evaluate specific attributes of risk management methods. Without a technique to compare risk
management methodologies, a framework from which we could base our research was
missing. Thus, we focused our efforts on developing a paradigm that facilitates the
comparison of risk management methods utilizing factors such as suitability, quality or
acceptability.
Because the initial literature search failed to uncover any significant work in the
area of suitability, quality, or acceptability metrics for computer security risk management,
we expanded our search to a broader scope of risk management disciplines. The results of
the search indicated that little work had been done in this area.
In 1978, Stephen Pollock submitted an article to the Advanced Research Institute
on 'Education in Systems Science' that explains the use of a university modeling studio to
teach mathematical modeling. As part of the article, he defines and discusses twelve
attributes that he uses to evaluate models produced by his students. His method is purely
subjective and qualitative in nature, but the attributes could be adapted to our needs as many
of methods for risk management use modeling techniques. (Pollock, 1978, pp.2 11-225)
In 1981, Fischhoff, et al, attempted to establish evaluation criteria for social
science risk analysis methods. They were able to categorize acceptable-risk decision making
methods into three groups: 1) formal analysis, 2) bootstrapping, and 3) professional
judgement to which they subjectively applied seven criteria of acceptability. Again, the
criteria are qualitatively defined. (Fischhoff, et al, 1981, pp.47-60)
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Another effort that bears discussion for this thesis has been conducted by
Merkhofer in 1985, also for the evaluation of social risk management and decision-aiding
approaches. Merkhofer categorizes criteria for evaluation as either internal (which pertains
to the domain of the analysis) or external (which pertains to the considerations and constraints
outside of the analysis). Within this classification of the considerations for a particular
decision-aiding approach, Merkhofer specifically defines criteria as "logical soundness,"
"completeness," "accuracy," "practicality," and "acceptability." Each of these criterion are
used to assist the analyst in determining which methodology is most suitable for his given
situation. Unfortunately, the interpretation of the meaning or degree of applicability for each
criterion is again left to the judgement of the analyst. (Merkhofer, 1987, p.18 9)
Our intentions are not to imply that the judgement of the analyst is not an
acceptable evaluation medium. Quite the contrary, it is the analyst that is in the best position
to determine which methodology should be selected. The desire for a more objective or
measurable criteria is to remove analysts' deficiencies or biases from the evaluation, thereby
enhancing the evaluation of suitability of a method to a given situation. Using Merkhofer's
criterion of practicality, how does one distinguish all the attributes that describe practicality
for one method and compare them with those of another method using qualitative
descriptions? What Merkhofer's method needs is a technique that would granulate each
criterion and each attribute to a level that could be quantitatively measured.
The research conducted in the field of Software Engineering, specifically the
development of software quality metrics, provides a means of quantitatively measuring
quality. Software engineering metrics assist an evaluator in assessing the quality of software
under development. We recognized this ability to quantitatively measure qualitative
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characteristics as adaptable to the problems of risk management. The potential for this
adaptation drove the literature review for the thesis well beyond the risk management and risk
analysis arena to include the works of software quality pioneers such as McCall, Boehm, and
others.
Utilizing their techniques, a conceptual approach for the development of our
evaluation method ensued. This approach necessitates the establishment of the relationships
of criteria to suitability and the definition of those criteria. Further decomposition of each
criterion describes those attributes necessary to quantify a series of measurable components
(McCall, et al, 1977, pp.1-2). These components form a set of metrics that are used to
provide a value for each of the criteria. This thesis develops an evaluation strategy for
comparing computer security risk management methodologies and tools through granulation
of criteria to their measurable components.
C. THESIS STRUCTURE
In this chapter, we have established a need for an improved methodology for computer
security risk management. As we conducted a survey of available methods, we became
involved in the actual evaluation of those different methods, and changed our focus from
developing a more effective and efficient risk management method to the task of designing
and developing evaluation criteria for the suitability of risk management and risk analysis
methods for computer security. Our rationale and technique as well as the scope of our
literature search have been explained in this chapter.
Chapter II defines and describes our criteria, their attributes, and the relationship of the
metrics. Chapter III discusses a variety of options for applying the metrics, and evaluates four
10
generic risk analysis methods. Extending the application of the metrics to four actual risk
management tools is accomplished in Chapter IV. In conclusion, Chapter V discusses the
implications of utilizing the metrics as a guide to the development of an optimal methodology,
and provides concluding remarks with recommendations for further research.
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II. SUITABILITY METRICS
A. ENVIRONMENT REQUIRING METRICS
In the past, risk management was performed routinely by practitioners of all disciplines
based on combinations of common sense, personal experience, trial and error, and ordinary
knowledge. In recent decades however, technology has driven the capabilities of this society
to new and exciting achievements. With those achievements, however, technology has
brought an abundance of new risks that must be understood. To understand and prepare for
these risks, society demands analytical methods that allow planning, forecasting and
forewarning of events which may be adverse. The scientific community has responded to this
demand with numerous quantitative analytical methods for risk management and decision-
making under uncertainty. (Barclay, et al, 1977) This response by itself has introduced
another problem: which method is best for a particular situation?
Selection of a particular methodology is a difficult task for individuals responsible for
the performance of risk management within an organization. There are several prerequisites
a person must possess in order to successfully accomplish his task; the first of which is a
thorough understanding of the system he is managing. This includes understanding not only
the technical aspects such as hardware, software and communications, but also the non-
technical aspects such as the personnel that have access to the system, the procedures they
are using, and the stakeholders' concerns about that system. The second prerequisite is that
he must understand the scope of the analysis he must perforn and its suitability to the
purposes of the organization. This entails determining how detailed the analysis should be,
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how significant the treatment of uncertainty is to the result, and the appropriate form of the
results for making a decision. Both of these requirements will be different for each manager,
for each organization, and for each system.
The third prerequisite is to gain a thorough understanding of enough of the methods
available so that the analyst can choose the one appropriate for a given situation. This
requirement remains relatively constant, yet is overwhelming for one individual. Within the
information resource technology discipline, several risk management methods are available
for determining risks. Among these are Quantitative, Checklist, Scenario, Questionnaire
methodologies, and hybrids of each. Each method has its own strengths and weaknesses
depending on its application. The culmination of a risk assessment is the determination of
a level of risk that is compared to an acceptable level of risk for that organization. If it
exceeds the acceptable level, then a decision must be made regarding the excess risk. If it
doesn't exceed the acceptable level, then no action is required. Gaining proficiency with each
of these methods, as well as any new method that may be developed, is generally difficult.
Selection of a suitable methodology is further exacerbated by the complexity of large
mathematical models and the amount of information required to be maintained about a system
to complete the analysis (Barclay, et al, 1977). As a result, the mechanics of performing risk
analysis procedures has evolved from manual paper and pencil drills to the use of the
computer for storing, computing and analyzing the entire process. Federal agencies and
commercial vendors have responded to the need for risk management packages with a
multitude of products from simple database storage to sophisticated analysis packages
employing artificial intelligence and expert systems.
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The Risk Management Research Laboratory, sponsored by NIST and the NCSC,
provides facilities to examine and compare various commercially available risk management
products. The lab has become a central repository of risk management tools which facilitates
the accessibility of the products for evaluation and comparison by federal agencies. During
the course of our research, we had the opportunity to visit the lab and examine over two
dozen risk management packages. Although the lab provides the convenience of having these
products at one location, we experienced the frustration and confusion of the absence of an
evaluation and comparison criteria.
The lack of a systematic and standard comparison criteria makes any attempt at
evaluating tools arbitrary and indiscriminate. It is apparent that most managers in the position
of selecting an automated risk management tool (or more generally, selecting a methodology
for risk management) have little guidance or rationale to make a suitability determination.
If the NISTINCSC lab could incorporate a technique which provided a standardized evaluation
method, its functionality would be greatly enhanced.
In 1982, Congress passed the Risk Analysis Research and Demonstration Act which
was "...intended to encourage researchers to 'define criteria and standards to guide the
development and use of risk analysis' and 'to improve the methodologies' used in risk
analysis." (Shrader-Frechette, 1985, p.5) As a result of our literature search, it became
apparent that significant efforts had gone into the development of improved risk management
methodologies, although little effort has been devoted to the definition of criteria and
standards.
The application of our criteria for evaluation of computer security risk management
methodologies follows those of Merkhofer (1987), but diverges when we reduce the
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subjectivity of the criteria by the introduction of metrics. We have examined many decision-
making methodologies in both the risk management and decision analysis disciplines. During
our examination, categories of characteristics were identified that were pertinent or important
to a specific situation, and we defined several qualitative attributes which describe suitability.
What is suitability? We have defined suitability as those characteristics of a risk
management methodology or tool that are pertinent and appropriate for the requirements of
a particular person, organization, system, and/or situation. Use of predefined criteria for
evaluation of tools and methods allows the user to make comparisons based on a standard
continuum and to tailor an evaluation to his particular needs. As it will become apparent, the
criteria and their attributes are qualitative in nature thus they submit themselves to subjective
interpretation. At this level, the evaluation criteria for suitability are just as difficult to
discern as suitability in totality. We remedied this by further decomposition of each attribute,
into what are referred to as metrics, which provide a quantita*ve description of the suitability
criteria. Each of these criteria are discussed in detail with their attributes and metrics in the
next section.
B. EVALUATION METRICS
The intent of this thesis is to provide a means of quantitatively measuring the suitability
of a method or tool for a particular organization for the purpose of evaluating methods or
tools. The procedure that will be used to accomplish this is listed in Table 1 below:
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TABLE 1. Steps for Measuring Suitability
1. Establish a set of criteria that describe a method's suitability.
2. Define the suitability criteria in terms of related attributes.
3. Specify metrics that describe the presence of the attributes.
4. Make a quantitative statement of the appearance of the suitability criteria by
determining the ratio of actual occurrences of a metric to the number of
possible occurrences.
5. Use the derived quantitative values for each of the criteria to evaluate and
compare the variety of methods and tools available to the organization.
By taking this approach, the analysis of suitability becomes standardized, flexible, and
expandable. Standardization of the evaluation method will provide continuity in comparative
figures. For instance, adaptability is judged consistently across all methods or tools and can
therefore be wised as a comparative measure. The analysis becomes flexible because the
AI
organization making 'the evaluation can choose which of the criteria best define suitability for
their organization. As an illustration, in an organization where there are a wide variety of
computer system configurations, adaptability and consistency might be more important than
useability. In this case, greater weight could be added to adaptability and consistency. As
the definitions of suitability are refined, the analytical method presented is expandable by
simply adding metrics, attributes, or criteria as they are developed. This chapter will detail
the procedures for achieving the steps one through three from Table 1 while Chapter Three
will demonstrate the application of steps four and five.
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To maintain consistency throughout the thesis, a number of definitions are provided:
* Criterion. A characteristic or trait which indicates a level of suitability for a risk
management method or tool. Criteria actively contribute to the suitability of a method
by their presence.
" Attribute. A quality which, when taken with other attributes, describes, defines, or
judges a criterion.
" Metric. A boolean question which provides a specific measure for each of the attributes
related to the criteria. Most of the metrics are subjectively determined and are intended
to provide a direct evaluation of the degree of existence of an attribute. The unit of
measure for the metrics is expressed as a ratio of the number of occurrences of the
metric to the number of possible occurrences.
Following the procedures listed earlier, our first task was to specify the criteria that
describe suitability. Adjectives t~iat typify suitability were listed and then grouped according
to their relationships with each other. Each of the groupings constituted a criterion while the
adjectives in the group became the attributes of the criterion. Finally, we defined the
attributes in terms of a comprehensive set of rudimentary, boolean questions. These questions
comprise our metrics. For example, the question, "Is there a standardized interface?" is a
metric of the attribute 'ease of use.' The questions were worded to imply a positive aspect
of the attribute if answered in the affirmative. In this way, the existence of that metric
implies that the characteristic contributes to the presence of the attribute.
The result of this process was seven criteria composed of between two and four
attributes. The criteria are: consistency, useability, adaptability, feas'bili,, completeness,
validity, and credibility (see Table 2). Each will be discussed in detail in the paragraphs
below.
The relationship between criteria, their attributes, and metrics described above supports
formulation of a simple mathematical relationship between the metrics and their associated
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TABLE 2. Suitability Criteria
Consistency. Given a particular system configuration, results obtained from
independent analysis will not significantly differ.
Useability. The effort necessary to learn, operate, prepare input, and interpret
output is generally worth the results obtained.
Adaptability. The structure of the method or tool can be applied to a variety
of computer system configurations (and the inputs can be easily updated as they
periodically change).
Feasibility. The required data is available and can be economically gathered.
Completeness. Consideration of all relevant relationships and elements of risk
management is given.
Validity. The results of the process represent the real phenomenon.
Credibility. The output is believable and has merit.
criterion. When an evaluation of a method or tool takes place, the resultant measurements
can be viewed as a set:
(Mi, in. . .... My ) (1)
Each element, mi, represents a boolean measure of the presence of that aspect of the
attribute in the criterion. To develop a mathematical expression of each attribute, ,, held by




For example, if six of the nine possible metrics of the attribute scope are positive, the
value of A, is calculated by dividing the number of positive metrics (6) by the total possible
number of metrics (9) for that attribute (.666).
A criterion, Ck, in turn, is expressed mathematically as a ratio of the sum of the




With expressions of criteria described, a description of the suitability, S. of a method
or tool can be expressed as an ordered set of the values of its criteria:
S- (C1, C2, C3 ... c) (4)
Finally, an evaluation of a method is simplified by comparison of the suitability
expressions of various risk management methods or tools. For instance, the suitability of a
particular method can be compared to another method by examining the elements of the two
vectors, S, and S2. A 'suitability index,' St, can be derived by attaching appropriate weights,
Wq, to the criteria and summing the results for all criteria. The suitability index is then




The approach described above is the most simple application of the evaluation
technique. Additional methods of application of the evaluation metrics are described in
Chapters III and IV.
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Each of the seven attributes will now be described in turn:
1. Consistency
The concept of consistency, as applied to suitability of risk management methods
or tools, implies an ability to duplicate the results of the process. In other words, given a
particular system configuration, results obtained from independent analysis will not
significantly differ. Consistency was determined to have the attributes of reliability and
conistent terminology (see Figure 1).
A key component of
reliability is objectivity, or the comkmacy
reduction of subjectivity in the
process. Objectivity reduces the
wide amount of variance that could
occur as a result of personal biases. M" ak
A variety of researchers including
Kahneman (1982) and Gardner Figure 1. Consistency
(1989) have provided writings on the subject of bias and its effect on decision-making.
When laypeople are asked to evaluate risks, they seldom have statistical evidence on
hand. In most cases, they must make inferences based on what they remember hearing
or observing about the risk in question. Psychological research ... has identified a
number of general inferential rules that people seem to use in such situations. These
judgmental rules, known as heuristics, are employed to reduce difficult mental tasks to
simpler ones. Although they are valid in some circumstances, in others they lead to
large and persistent biases with serious implications for decision making.... (Slovic, et
al, 1980, pp.464-465)
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Fischhoff (1982) describes a number of methods of reducing or eliminating biases
from the decision making process. The more the process reduces biases in the analysis, the
more consistent the results will be between analysis teams.
Another aspect of reliability is the reduction of uncertainty. Uncertainty, by
definition, is a significant part of risk and the risk management process. For results of the
process to be consistent across analysis teams, an effective mechanism must exist to reduce
the impact of uncertainty.
To control differences in interpretation of what the process is asking for and what
the product represents, a uniform set of terminology must be established between the analyst
and the process. This involves providing understandable definitions to the analyst which wifll
be consistently applied throughout. Terms should be used in their commonly accepted context
and unambiguously defined to avoid misinterpretation.
Table 3 below and Template 1 in Appendix A describe the criterion of
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2. Useability
Useability is defined as the value of the effort necessary to learn, prepare
input, execute the process, and interpret output. The four steps described above represent
the interface between the analyst and the process. Hence, for a process to be useable to
an operator, it must be understandable, easy to use, simple, and effective at handling
errors (see Figure 2).
Understandable refers to the ability to comprehend the underlying premise that
supports the method. The need for understandability is underscored by Fischhoff, et al:
An approach should not make matters worse by obscuring its internal functioning.
All those whose fate it may affect have a right to ask: What are its underlying
assumptions? What are its political and philosophical roots? ... What inputs were
used? What computational procedures were followed? How much uncertainty
surrounds the entire enterprise? To be valid an approach must provide answers to
these questions.... The unexamined approach is hardly worth using. An approach
that fails to test its effectiveness and clarify its prejudices is not to be trusted.
(Fischhoff, et al, 1981, pp.5 6 -5 7 )
The user of the method
does not have to grasp all aspects
( Uwabilty
of the process, but must have an
appreciation for what will be asked
of him and how the results of the 
& ,r,
process relate to the inputs. Can
he understand what decisions are
Figure 2. Useability
expected of him, and what
22
decisions are being made by the process? Can he follow the process (in general terms)
to appreciate the rationale of the output?
The next attribute that contributes to the definition of useability is ease of use.
Although the definition of ease of use could be considered intuitive to the reader, our
definition embraces a process that is well structured and logically sequential. The result
is a procedurally unconvoluted process. Along with this structured process, there must
be a consistent interface that allows the analyst to concentrate on his task rather than on
the process itself.
At the risk of appearing trivial, we differentiate ease of use from simplicity.
The distinction between ease of use and simplicity is demonstrated by the modem
telephone system. The underlying technology of the telephone is far from simple with
its elaborate networks, relays, and switches. Yet, the telephone is easy to use because of
its consistent interface and the concealment of this technological complexity from the
user. Simplicity implies that the complexity of the process is concealed without obscuring
the premise. No special training should be required of a simple system, nor should an
expert knowledge base be required of the user to operate it.
The last attribute for useability is error handling. Previous attributes of
useability dealt with all three phases of a procedure; input, processing, and output. Error
handling, however, is focused on input only. The method or tool becomes more useable
when input errors are readily identified and the resolution of the errors are facilitated.
Another aspect of error handling is the sensitivity of the process to insignificant data
accuracy errors. This sensitivity must be accommodating for those errors that don't
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impact the final output. Many decision analysis methods, for instance, use orders of
magnitude to alleviate the concern over minor accuracy errors. Cooper, in describing an
Annual Loss Expectancy method for risk management, provides a table of threat
frequency ranging from 100 times per day to once every 300 years (stepping by a factor
of 10). His reason for utilizing orders of magnitude is to "...operate within the bounds
of the input accuracy and to minimize computational complexity and time expended."
(Cooper, 1989, p.28)
Template 2 in Appendix A describes the criterion of useability, lists its
attributes and their associated metrics, and represents the mathematical relationships
between them.
3. Adaptability
Adaptability describes suitability in so much as the structure of the method or
tool can be applied to a variety of computer system configurations. Additionally, stored
data can be easily updated as it periodically changes. The attributes that describe
adaptability are portability and modifiability (see Figure 3).
Portability is the ability to apply the process across a variety of computer
system classifications and configurations. For example, a method that is designed for a
single site mainframe environment and does not pertain to a highly distributed
environment would receive a poor ranking in portability. Within a single system,
portability also applies to the mode by which the system processes jobs; i.e. batch versus
interactive processing. Another facet of portability is its applicability to not only the
system but also to the immediate environment of the subject system. Does changing the
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location of the computer system
cause the method to become Adability
ineffectual or will it still apply
because it considers the system's
environment? And finally, system
life cycles must be taken into Men*$ --k
consideration to reflect the
Figure 3. Adaptability
changing disposition of all systems
as they progress from inception to replacement
Just as it is important for a method to be portable because systems change, a
method should also be capable of retaining original input values for recall and segmenting
calculations into logical partitions. This capability would allow for examining the effects
of a particular change while holding most other variables constant - a 'What if?'
capability. Katzke, in his summary of issues addressed by the 1985 Risk Analysis
Workshop, listed a set of desirable properties of a risk management method. These
properties included automation, which "... maintains [sic] database of system
descriptions ...." and a capability which "... allows iterative safeguard cost benefit
analysis." (Katzke, 1985, p.15) We have identified this capability as modifiability which
addresses that portion of adaptability that assists the analyst in examining alternatives or
options.
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Template 3 in Appendix A describes the criterion of adaptability, lists its
attributes and their associated metrics, and represents the mathematical relationships
between them.
4. Feasibility
The criterion of feasibility characterizes the input data to a method. It is
concerned with the amount of data that must be collected, the economy of gathering that
data, and whether the data is obtainable without extraordinary measures. The attributes
that describe feasibility are availability, practicality and scope (see Figure 4).
Availability distin-
guishes that data which is ( "t
accessible from within the organi-
zation (either from expert - lncdclll SCW
knowledge or historical records) i
from that data which must be &V
collected externally. This is not to I
Figure 4. Feasibility
imply, however, that all data
requirements are fulfilled from internal sources for it to be available. Data required which
is not organic should be convenient to collect, thereby conforming with the intent of the
availability attribute.
Practicality, on the other hand, is concerned with the economics of gathering
the required data. Data collection for any system is not free. The cost of performing the
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data collection must be estimated prior to initiation and a conscious decision to expend
the necessary effort and time to accomplish this task has to be made.
Practicality means that the analysis can be conducted in the real-world, problem-
solving environment using available resources and information.... Practicality is
obviously influenced by the availability of required inputs and the extent to which
the approach is flexible in its ability to use different types of input data.
(Merkhofer, 1987, p.191)
Practicality is also the required precision of the data from the method's
perspective. As a negative example, if a method demands evaluation of asset value to the
nearest cent, it might be considered impractical for a situation where assets are valued in
the millions of dollars.
For a method or procedure to be feasible, it should also allow the analyst to
select or determine his own level of detail or precision. This is what we refer to as the
scope of the analysis. The analysis of a system is shaped by the breadth that the process
allows the analyst to select. Scope is the means by which the bounds of an analysis are
defined, thereby influencing the acceptability and usefulness of a method. Stevens and
Weiner noted the difficulty experienced by Department of Energy (DOE) officials with
their risk assessments, "Most of the DOE professionals surveyed indicated that they had
difficulty in determining the scope of a risk assessment..." (Stevens and Weiner, 1989,
p.475). Because of scope's significance, methods should consider the different segments
of a system such as hardware, software, data, personnel, procedures, communications, and
the environment that the system functions within. Scope has an impact on other criteria
as well, and will be further described below.
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Template 4 in Appendix A describes the criterion of feasibility, lists its
attributes and their associated metrics, and represents the mathematical relationships
between them.
5. Completeness
Completeness is defined as providing comprehensive coverage of all
considerations of the risk management problem. To be complete, a method should regard
all components and the attributes of those components of the system. Additionally, the
process should examine the computer system at the level of detail desired by the analyst.
The attributes that describe completeness are scope, elements and element attributes (see
Figure 5).
For completeness to be
achieved, a comprehensive exam- Completerim
ination of the key elements of risk
management should be given. To
date, a consensus has not been
reached by practitioners in the
computer security risk manage-
Figure 5. Completeness
ment discipline to define an
exhaustive list of the key elements and their attributes. Probably the best effort to list and
define those elements and attributes is provided by Mayerfeld. In his paper, he prepared
a composite of elements and attributes developed by four independent working groups of
the 1988 Computer Security Risk Management Model Builder's Workshop:
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Within a scoped system three central elements operate to determine the risk of the
system. These primary elements are assets, threats, (threat agent/threat event), and
vulnerabilities/safeguards. An asset is defined in terms of its value, a threat event
in terms of its undesirability, and a safeguard in terms of its effectiveness.
... The asset is the entity whose risk we measure (normally in aggregate sets of
assets), and whose protection we desire. The critical attribute of an asset is value....
Undesirable outcomes that can befall assets are initiated or accomplished by or
through threats, that can change an existing state to a new, potentially less desirable,
state. The term 'threat,' ... refers to both threat agents and threat events.... The
defining characteristic of a threat agent is its potency, which is an aggregate
measure of its potential to instigate a threat event The critical attribute of a threat
event is its undesirability. A complete analysis of the outcomes and consequences
of a particular threat event is necessary in order to fully assess how undesirable it
is....
Protection of assets is accomplished by the existence or implementation of
safeguards, or countermeasures. Safeguards can be active or passive, and are often
defined as part of the scoped system. The critical attribute of a safeguard is its
effectiveness. Any measure of effectiveness also requires an analysis of the threat
events against which the safeguard is said to be effective.
The interactions between the three primary elements determine the outcomes or
consequences, that are likely to result, and their likelihood. The key attribute of an
outcome is its severity." (Mayerfeld, 1989, pp.10-11)
Using Mayerfeld's definitions, the elements that should be considered by a
complete method are assets, threat agents, threat events, safeguards, vulnerabilities, and
outcomes.
The ability of the user to control the level of detail of analysis and consider
all aspects of the system, defined earlier as scope, is an important aspect of completeness.
To satisfy the needs of the organization, the process must be able to adapt to the needs
of the analyst to examine his system in the detail that he desires and analyze any and all
aspects of the system.
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Template 5 in Appendix A describes the criterion of completeness, lists its
attributes and their associated metrics, and represents the mathematical relationships
between them.
6. Validity
Validity is measured as the extent to which the results of the process represent
the real phenomenon. In other words, the conclusion of the analysis resembles what is
experienced in reality. For instance, if the process recommends a perimeter fence for a
computer center located on the twelfth floor of an office building, the process is not valid.
The attributes that describe validity are relevancy, scope and practicality (see Figure 6).
Relevancy means that
the results are meaningful to the Vk "y
system. To avoid irrelevant
conclusions such as the example R SCWC -- h-
cited above, a process should
provide categories of solutions Mr, N.C,
rather than specific recommend-
Figure 6. Validity
ations. A recommendation of
9access control' (as a category) rather than a specific recommendation of 'a fence' would
be less likely to be irrelevant, although not necessarily preferrable. Results from a
method should relate to significant areas of need and incorporate mandated security
requirements to maintain their relevancy.
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To be valid, the method must be able to provide the scope, as defined in
paragraphs above, at the level of detail required by the analyst. Scope determines the
extent of the detail used by the process and is necessary. Otherwise, the method's
perspective does no+ reflect the intent of the analyst.
Practicality is conversely related to validity. The lack of practicality suggests
that biased or erroneous input data would be provided in the place of data that could not
be economically gathered. Presumably, the result in this case would be less valid than
if data collection was practical.
Template 6 in Appendix A describes the criterion of validity, lists its attributes
and their associated metrics, and represents the mathematical relationships between them.
7. Credibility
The credibility of a particular method or process has significant bearing on the
acceptability of its conclusions. If any aspect of the process is questionable, the entire
process will be suspect to the users. The attributes that describe credibility are
intuitiveness and reliability (see Figure 7).
The input, process, and output of a method or tool must have ;i natural feel
that will instill and maintain the confidence of the analyst. This intuitiveness is
measured in terms of the amount of information available to the user. If the method
delineates the relationships between elements, the analyst will be able to understand how
values ar derived and is likely to find them plausible. In the same way, the output of
the process must have a perceptible relationship to the data that was provided. Finally,
if the method fails to analyze an aspect of the system that the user knows to be flawed
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or require protection, his
confidence in the method will be Q "fl
diminished.
Reliability as previously
described for consistency also
pertains to credibility. If different
results are returned with the same __
Figure 7. Credibility
data on different occasions, the
method will hold little plausibility to those interpreting the output. The reliability of the
method, that is, the ability to obtain repeatable results, has a direct bearing on the
credibility of a process.
Template 7 in Appendix A describes the criterion of credibility, lists its
attributes and their associated metrics, and represents the mathematical relationships
between them.
C. ANTICIPATED RESULTS
As described, it is apparent that not all of the criteria can be maximized
simultaneously. This is because some criteria are maximized at the expense of others.
For example, in order to achieve useability, some degree of completeness will likely be
sacrificed. Determining the best risk management tool or method will require trading one
desirable trait for another. Merkhofer observed the same phenomenon:
Notice that the various evaluation criteria are not independent. Weaknesses in some
areas (e.g. logical soundness) are likely to preclude strengths in others (e.g.
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acceptability). Furthermore, some of the goals may be in conflict It may be easier
to derive a logically sound decision rule by leaving out certain awkward issues and
thereby sacrificing completeness. If no approach does, or even can, satisfy all of
the criteria and if their respective strengths and weaknesses lie in different areas,
then the choice of an approach will require tradeoffs. (Merkhofer, 1986, p.1 9 2 )
Consequently, it is felt by the authors that a categorical statement of which method
is the "best" cannot be made. Suitability of a method can only be determined by careful
consideration of the needs of the organization with respect to the attributes and criteria
described in this chapter. After that consideration, a choice of which tool is most suitable
can be made. Chapter III will offer alternative procedures for applying the metrics and





Chapter H established a means by which the difficulties of evaluating the suitability
of risk management methodologies can be managed through the utilization of metrics.
This chapter will augment the metric method of Chapter HI by proposing alternative
application options, suggesting a procedure for their use, and finally, applying the metrics
to four underlying risk analysis methods. The results are examined with regard to the
usefulness of the metrics by comparing them with intuitive predictions. We found a
strong correlation between the predictions and the observations drawn from the results of
the evaluation. This in turn provides our rationale for further application. Through this
test of our evaluation method, we ascertained that the application of the metrics had a
logical basis and provided reasonably accurate results.
B. APPLICATION ALTERNATIVES
There are a multitude of alternatives available to the analyst for the application of
the metrics in an evaluation. The choice of which alternative to use depends upon the
experience of the analyst and his requirement to tailor the evaluation to his organizational
needs. Three potential linear models are discussed below.
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1. Normative Relationship Model
The most rudimentary approach to the evaluation process uses a linear model
with normative relationships between criteria and between attributes. The metrics are
used as a boolean measure of the presence of an attribute. The values of the criteria are
based only on the attribute quotients. The coefficients of criteria and attributes have a
value of one, thus providing a uniform representation of suitability. The application of
this model was described mathematically in Chapter II (formulas (1) through (4)).
There are a number of advantages to the use of this method, the most
significant of which is its simplicity. In describing the process of modeling a
phenomenon, Wan advocates that simplicity contributes to productivity in the initial stages
of development:
For any particular phenomenon, we begin by identifying a few important questions
of interest and the main factors influencing the answers. We may have more
contributing factors; but it is usually more productive to keep things simple initially
and consider other issues after success with the simpler problem. (Wan, 1989, p.1)
As such, an analyst can utilize the normative relationship model without
knowledge or concerns about the relationship between criteria. With all criteria and
attributes considered equally, the distinction between strengths and weaknesses is
manifested in the numerical ratings without complicated analysis. Additionally, without
subjective assessments of the prominence of each criteria, minimization of bias is assured.
Nevertheless, there may exist a desire or requirement to weight one criteria over another.
Application of the normative model is demonstrated in Chapters Ell and IV.
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2. Significance Coefficients Model
In the application of this approach, the metrics remain boolean statements of
the presence of an attribute, however, a significance coefficient, W, can be applied to
either the attribute or criteria as determined by the need and desire of the analyst The
significance coefficient is established by the analyst to meet organizational needs with
regard to risk management. For instance, if an organization has no professional computer
security staff, and risk management will be conducted by personnel unfamiliar with those
practices, useability might be weighted more heavily than consistency. Closer scrutiny
may suggest that, 'ease of use' and 'understandability' may be more beneficial to this
organization than 'portability' or 'modifiability'.
When attributes are weighted, metric values are collected as noted in Chapter
II. The metrics remain boolean in nature and represent the presence of a particular
attribute. Following the measurement of each metric, attributes, Aj, are described as in
formula (2) (repeated below) where the attribute is the sum of its positive metrics divided
by the total number of metrics:
FDn,
Aj - i-1
After determining values for each attribute, the significance coefficient, 4, is
attached to each attribute. The coefficient is established by the analyst relative to his
organization's needs as discussed earlier. A criterion, C'k, is represented by the set of its
attributes:
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C/ - (WA , W 3 A, W 1 4-..... WA) (6)
The metric value of the individual criterion is mathematically expressed as:
iW,4j (7)
C/t- J-1
Finally, as presented in Chapter II (formula (4) duplicated below), suitability,
S, becomes an expression of the set of values for the criteria from which an evaluation
can be made:
S - (C , C 2 , C 3 9 ... C)
If the analyst requires only a more general evaluation of the risk analysis tools
available, the evaluation criteria rather than attributes could be weighted. If this is the
case, formulas (1) through (3) apply, where criteria are expressed as a simple ratio of its
attribute's value to the number of attributes as in formula (3) below:
Ck~L
n
After attribute values are determined, a weighting value, Wk, is assigned to
each attribute. The suitability, S', of a tool is then represented by the set:
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S,- (WIC, W2C2, W3C3, .... WkC) (8)
3. Metric Utility Model
In a situation where two tools are closely matched in a particular category, one
tool can be distinguished from another more readily by employing utility techniques with
the metrics. Such techniques or utility functions may employ various ranges of
acceptability, for instance, one to five represents the worse to the best response
respectively. Utility is defined as the decision-maker's measure of the value of a
particular alternative, taking into account his preference for return as opposed to avoiding
risk. Von Neumann and Morgenstem developed an approach to decision making in which
the decision-maker attempts to choose the alternative that will maximize his expected
utility (Von Neumann, 1947, pp.15-31).
Another technique could utilize fuzzy set descriptors to characterize the
uncertainty involved in assigning values to metrics such as 'Always', 'Usually', 'Never',
etcetera. Zadeh describes the practicality of fuzzy techniques:
In recent years, however, it has become increasingly clear that uncertainty is a
multifaceted concept in which some of the important facets do not lend themselves
to probability-based methods. One such facet is that of fuzzy imprecision, which
is associated with the use of fuzzy predicates exemplified by small, large, fast, near,
likely, etc. The question is: How can one express the meaning of this proposition
through the use of probability-based methods?... It is questions such as these that
motivated the development of fuzzy-set-theoretic techniques for dealing with
problems in which uncertainty derives from fuzzy imprecision.... The techniques
for dealing with information which is both fuzzily imprecise and probabilistically
uncertain have a direct bearing on the important problem of inference from
commonsense knowledge and its application to decision analysis. (Zadeh, 1988,
Foreword)
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An example of the application of fuzzy methods to computer security risk
analysis can be found in the works of Bruce, Kandel, and Avni (Bruce, 1988, pp.17-49)
and in the works of Schmucker (Schmucker, 1984).
In a case where weighted metrics are employed, the coefficient, W,, is assigned
based on the analyst's selection of a utility function. Assignment of the weight is made
at the time the metric is evaluated and is used in the calculation of the value for each
attribute A':
n
Attributes, once computed, are used as described in formulas (3) and (4) for
comparative purposes. This model can be used in combination with the normative
relationship model or the significance coefficient model to further accommodate known
idiosyncrasies within a particular organization.
C. ANALYSIS PROCEDURE EMPLOYED
The greatest benefit derived from any of the weighted approaches is the flexibility
they allow an analyst or organization. They provide a means of distinguishing the criteria
that are more significant to a particular requirement. Although the use of weighted
procedures for the evaluation in this chapter was a viable option, a fictitious corporate
situation would have to be created that prejudged specific criteria. We felt that this was
beyond the scope of this thesis and would have clouded the issue of comparison.
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Consequently, the unweighted normative relationship model was selected because it would
not encumber the analysis.
To reduce the volume of paper and forms associated with the suitability evaluations
that were conducted for this chapter and to facilitate the comparison of the responses to
the metrics, Templates 1 through 4 in Appendix B were utilized. They provided a single,
adjoining view of all of the metrics, attributes, and criteria values for each method.
Through the use of these forms, a quick comparison of four different risk management
approaches or tools could be easily accomplished. Template 5 in Appendix B provides
a comprehensive view of the criteria and attribute values for each method evaluated.
The mechanics of completing the templates is quite simple. If the answer to a
metric is determined to be positive, the appropriate box is marked. Blanks indicate a
negative response to the metric. Upon completion of all the metrics for a single method
or tool, the values are calculated by summing the marked metrics for each attribute and
dividing the summation by the total number of metrics for that attribute as in Formula (2).
Likewise, the value for the criteria is calculated the same way. The result is placed in
the corresponding box. When each method or tool has been subjected to the metrics, the
evaluation is concluded by comparing the results horizontally for each criterion or




Risk management is meant to include the complete decision process from risk
analysis to the decision of safeguard selection. Although the metrics have been designed
to measure risk management tools, they can also be used to evaluate a major segment of
the risk management process, risk analysis. Underlying risk analysis methods are distinct
and recognizable, while risk management (which encompasses risk analysis) includes a
host of decision-making process choices. The multitude of choices obfuscates a general
classification of risk management techniques. Therefore, we make the general distinction
between risk management methods by the risk analysis technique contained therein. For
this reason we chose to conduct our evaluation on risk analysis techniques, making the
assumption that it was accompanied by a generic decision-making process.
A further description of each of the methods will assist the reader in adjusting
to the same level of perception of the methods that is used for the predictions. To
conduct a test of the metrics' utility, we selected four simple, intuitively understandable
methods of conducting risk analysis. Those descriptions and the predictions are provided
in the paragraphs below.
2. General Description of Methods
a. Quantitative Methods
There are a variety of distinctive quantitative methods for risk
management. To apply our evaluation techniques to each of these would not significantly
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enhance the comparison of the underlying methods. Consequently, we have chosen to
represent this category by the most commonly encountered implementation of quantitative
methods, Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE).
ALE is a method of characterizing the foreseeable losses that a system
might incur through the use of statistical probability. Each asset in a system is
individually considered with its associated threats. Frequencies (f) of occurrence are
estimated along with the potential cost (c) or value of the loss. The anticipated annual
loss for that asset from that specific threat is derived by taking the product of the
frequency and the associated cost. To derive a comprehensive view of system
vulnerabilities under the ALE method, all assets and threats must be considered, and their
associated loss computed for each combination of assets and threats. The resultant figures
are compared and ranked from highest expected loss to lowest to readily identify where
the greatest potential losses could occur. (Hutt, 1988, pp.24-25)
The product of the ALE method must be augmented with additional
decision-making techniques to complete the risk management process. The risks that the
system face can be ranked according to organizational goals, and safeguards can be
selected to provide appropriate protection. This selection is usually predicated on a
minimum cost or maximum benefit evaluation of the ALE.
Nearly every application of ALE uncovered during our research provided
a simplified method for handling uncertainty. Uncertainty, or the lack of empirical
information about frequencies of the occurrence of threats and the actual cost of some
segments of a system, was handled through tables which defined frequencies or cost in
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terms of orders of magnitude. By selecting from an order of magnitude table, the user
need only be accurate by a factor of 10 (or any other order of magnitude applied to the
table).
b. Checklist
A technique that was popularized during the 1960's and early 1970's,
checklists approach the process by attempting to anticipate insecurities in the system and
checking for safeguards to ensure protection. Consisting of a series of questions intended
to test the existence of a safeguard, a series of "no" answers may indicate a trend in risk
to the system that requires additional protection. Checklists provide a means of
identifying weaknesses in a system, but lack a means of decision-making for the security
manager.
Because checklists are, by their nature, predefined, they tend to be
inflexible in their ability to accommodate changes to the system. They are usually
designed to be used in a broad variety of system installations (e.g. centralized batch
process, distributed terminals, LAN connected PC's, etc.), which makes them more
difficult to adapt to one particular system configuration than other methods such as ALE
or scenario. Krauss attempts to reduce the inherent inflexibility of his checklist by
allowing the user to add and remove pages of the checklist as required:
The SAFE approach provides something between an inflexible formula and an
expensive, completely custom-made evaluation procedure. SAFE represents a
feasible point between these extremes and, because a reasonably high degree of
custom-tailoring is permitted, the approach enables the vast majority of installations




The scenario methodology is suggestive of a 'think tank' technique. A
group of stakeholders combine ideas, knowledge, expertise, and intuition for the purpose
of analyzing, developing, and preparing possible alternatives to security related situations
or events. The entire process is free form - that is, it may be structured and strongly
guided toward the threat event it examines, or it may be loosely bound to a general
vulnerability, safeguard, or combination thereof that the analysis team desires. Cooper
describes scenarios as a "brainstorm" atmosphere that fosters a synergistic effect for
identifying vulnerabilities which might otherwise go undetected (Cooper, 1989, pp.36-37).
The development of a scenario analysis is initiated by a selective team
of personnel involved with a particular system in one fashion or another. Ideally, each
member would be a specialist from each aspect of the system. For instance, a typical
team for a centralized mainframe computer center might consist of the operations
manager, maintenance representative (hardware and software), operating system specialist,
communications specialist, programming or development representative, and the security
manager. Each member contributes a slightly different perspective to the discussions.
As the discussions progress, a situation is developed that targets a
particular asset or component of their system against a specific vulnerability or a
combination of vulnerabilities. The case is developed along several possibilities to
determine the most likely impact should the event actually occur. Additionally, an
examination of safeguards that would protect against those vulnerabilities or would lessen
the overall impact is usually included. The goal of the scenario team might range from
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the simple discovery and analysis of a vulnerability to an extensive decision-making
process for the selection of a safeguard. (Quade, 1975, p.ll 8 )
We considered the scenario methodology to be an iterative process which
requires the analysis team to deliberate over several generations of situations to achieve
an adequate appraisal.
d. Questionnaire
The questionnaire method of analysis is another qualitative technique.
As generally described by the literature, a questionnaire is a list of questions develope j
to elicit responses concerning the security of a system, or any aspect thereof. It is
distributed to a group of stakeholders, completed, and returned for analyqis by the security
team.
The form of the questions asked can be of two varieties, open-ended and
closed-ended questions. Fowler provides in-depth discussion on the impact and merits
of the type of questions that should be utilized for any given situation (Fowler, 1984,
p.87). C-enerally, open-ended questions are most appropriate for gathering information
about system vulnerabilities and threats. Thc; provide a forum for the respondent to
express his true opinion or allow the respondent to venture into areas of specific concern
to him. This technique has several advantages. The depth and detail of feelings provided
by respondents to open-ended questions provides the analyst with a strong sense or
perception of the disposition and mood of the environment in which the system must
function. When appropriately accumulated and appraised collectively, the questionnaire
can provide insight not achievabie by other methods. (Patton, 1980, p.28)
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In terms of disadvantages, open-ended questions frequently will return
topics beyond the desired scope of the analysis, are difficult to interpret, and are nearly
infeasible to quantify. Regardless of the type of questions utilized, the questionnaire is
also limited by the writing skills of the respondent, the effort required by the respondent,
and the inability of the analyst to further address or contemplate responses of particular
interest. Although these problems can be significant, they also can be minimized by
utilizig established design principles for questionnaires or employing a specialist to
design and analyze each questionnaire.
To enhance the decision portion of questionnaires, many practitioners
utilize the Delphi technique. The Delphi technique is a survey method that acquires a
decision from group consensus. A survey is distributed to a panel of experts involved
with a decision. The experts return their responses to an analyst, who accumulates the
data, consolidates the results, and redistributes the group results to the respondents.
Without communicating among themselves, the respondents reconsider their opinions
based on the group opinion and submit their new answers to the analyst. (Hutt, 1988,
pp.2 4 -2 5 )
Popularized by the RAND Corporation in the early 1970's, applications
of the Delphi method extended to numerous disciplines. While critiqueing the Delphi
method, Sackman acknowledged, "It became virtually indistinguishable from questionnaire
techniques." (Sackman, 1974, p. 5) Nevertheless and in spite of its success, he
recommended that it not be used as an alternative to more rigorous, scientific techniques
such as questionnaires until it could be thoroughly validated. (Sackman, 1974, p.74)
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Although we did not consider the Delphi method as an instrumental
component of questionnaire methods, we did make several other assumptions for the
comparison evaluation:
* The questionnaire is or was properly engineered by a specialist for our purposes.
* The writing skills of the respondents were not a detrimental factor.
* A sufficient number of questionnaires would be returned to analyze.
* A specialist is employed to assist in the analysis of the questionnaire answers.
Although the assumptions applied to our idealistic questionnaire would
certainly have an impact on the values attained by the metrics, they are reasonable and
necessary for the purposes of making an effective comparison.
3. Intuitive Predictions
Some results of an evaluation should be predictable. For instance, the
checklist method should rank relatively lower than quantitative methods (ALE) in the
adaptability criterion because checklists tend to be inflexible and difficult to modify.
Predictability provides an intuitive method of determining the usefulness of our technique
in lieu of empirical data. Although intuitive predictions cannot provide a fully acceptable
validation, they provide a reasonable expectation of correctness from which to justify the
collection of data for a more refined validation process.
Using this approach, intuitive predictions were made for each of the criteria.
The intuitive predictions provided below are based upon the knowledge gained during the
course of our literature review. Each of the seven criteria were individually and
comparatively considered with respect to the four methods. For each criterion, the best
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and worst method displaying the qualities of the criterion were selected. For instance,
each method (quantitative, checklist, scenario, and questionnaire) were examined as a
tuple for consistency, then useability, and so forth. Justification for the intuitive
predictions that we made are contained in the paragraphs below. Table 4 provides a















The checklist would be the most consistent of the methods because a
checklist's consistent terminology prevent significantly different results as different
analysts employed the technique. The questions themselves would remain unchanged and
only the differing perspectives and experience of the analysts would cause a difference
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in the results. Scenario, on the other hand, was the least consistent of the four methods
to be examined. This was justified by the fact that each scenario considered is strongly
influenced by the biases of the analysts involved. Hence, with each change in analysts,
the scenarios considered will differ significantly.
Because of its unchanging (except for minor modifications) interface with the
user, checklist was determined to be the most useable of the four methods. Assuming
that it has been appropriately selected to apply to the system it will evaluate, the checklist
is easy to pick up and implement. The output is simple to interpret; a vulnerability is
highlighted by a lack of a check in the box. Compiling the vulnerabilities into categories
is relatively simple and provides an understandable view of system weaknesses.
Conversely, the most difficult method to use (the least useable) was questionnaire. While
the questionnaire interface does not change from iteration to iteration, the compilation
process is very complex. After the questionnaires are returned, the opinions of each
respondent must be integrated with all others to derive action recommendations. With
the wide variety of opinions that an analyst is likely to receive, this task could be very
difficult.
Among the four methods, the most adaptable was the scenario method because
its free-form style provides the analyst the options of:
e selecting the approach and analytical procedures that he will employ.
a determining the level of detail that his team will take.
* deciding in what phase of the system life cycle he will conduct his analysis.
o adjusting his approach for each vulnerability or asset he considers.
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Alternatively, the least adaptable method was the checklist because the
checklist is either designed for a particular system configuration or is designed to suit a
very broad class of systems. Universal checklists tend to be fixed in its structure, hence,
they are not easily modified to accommodate system changes. In contrast, many of the
explicit checklists accommodate change by providing a facility to remove obsolete items
and add additional items as the system evolves. Although this is sufficient for modifying
the checklist for the system it was intended, the same checklist is not necessarily adequate
for another configuration.
While checklists have little ability to adapt, it was ranked the highest among
its peers in feasibility. This prediction was based on the fact that the data required to
accomplish the checklist was relatively easy to obtain and was the most easily gathered.
We considered questionnaire to be the most infeasible of the four methods because of the
amount of effort required to prepare, distribute, gather, and compile the necessary data.
To prepare an adequate questionnaire, specialists should be involved, making the process
longer and more intricate. Once completed, the questionnaires must be compiled into
specific action recommendations, a process that will involve deliberations to determine
which opinions hold the most merit, and how much weight to place on each. All of these
factors implicate questionnaires as the least feasible of the methods considered.
The least likely of the methods to be complete is the checklist method. Our
reasoning was reinforced by the fact that checklists are normally designed for a particular
system configuration (centralized data processing, distributed processing, etc.) and have
only a limited ability to cover a spectrum of systems. Additionally, checklists normally
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are designed to check the existence of a particular safeguard, and therefore do not
consider all of the elements or relationships that are an integral part of risk management.
As such, they lack completeness. Because scenario is a free-form method of analysis, it
can consider any aspect of the system that the analyst desires. Hence, system
configuration, environment, and all other segments of the system can be considered. For
this reason, the scenario method was chosen to be the most complete of the methods.
Validity, the measurement of how closely the process and its results represent
reality, was most present in scenario methods of risk management. Scenario was
considered to be the most valid because the team of experts involved in the scenario
process would be very familiar with the system and its vulnerabilities. Although it is
likely that the team would be influenced by their personal biases, scenario was perceived
as having the ability to represent the system in terms that the decision-makers would
understand and accept as authentic.
Conversely, the output of a checklist was believed to represent the least
accurate statement of the actual state of the system. Although this output represents a set
of safeguards that are not present, the set of vulnerabilities considered might not have
been complete. If a particular vulnerability is not on the checklist, the need for a
safeguard might not be addressed, and consequently, it will not be part of the checklist
output whether present or not. Alternatively, other methods provide a means of
introducing vulnerabilities, the checklist lacks a stimulation mechanism that would prompt
concern about a vulnerability not on the list. The analyst must resort to additional
methods to determine if his system is vulnerable to a threat that wasn't addressed by the
51
checklist. Consequently, checklists were not considered to reflect the true state of system
security, but rather, the true state of the system that applies to the checklist.
Of the four methods for risk management considered, questionnaire was the
most credible. This premise was based on the procedures contained in the questionnaires
themselves. Questionnaires collect all of the opinions and impressions of the users of the
system itself and as a result, the output (as a product of all of those opinions) should be
the most believable to the analyst. On the other hand, checklist methods was the least
credible as a result of their inherent inflexibility. Since they are so broad in their extent,
they tend to loose their authenticity, particularly in the eyes of the decision-maker.
E. CONCLUSIONS
The evaluation was conducted by the authors. The scores for each methodology in
this evaluation are provided in Appendix C and summarized in Table 5. Each
methodology was considered individually and entirely prior to proceeding to the next
methodology. Because the methods were analyzed without regard to a specific situation,
a consensus of our opinions was obtained prior to responding to each metric to ensure we
applied the metrics consistently. The following paragraphs are the conclusions drawn
from the results of the evaluation process.
1. Observations
a. Strengths and Weaknesses of Methodologies
Close scrutiny of Table 6 and Appendix C reveals that the strengths and
weaknesses of each method are easily discernable. For instance, ALE ranked the highest
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TABLE 5. Comparison of Predictions to Results
PREDICTION MEASUREMEN'T
CoiastencY HOg Checklist Checklist
LOWSw I
Useability High Checlist Checklis
LOW Qustonaie Quionaire
Ajwtailiy High Scro ari
LOW CheklistI~
Feasib~ility High Checkist Scenario
Low Qusionaire ALE
Comnpletens High Scenario Scenaioueiamare
LOW Cbecklis Cekls
Valdty High scearino scearicoQuestiamir
LOW Checkst Checklist
CMdlibility High Qulesikxmlaie Checklist
LOW Checklist Questioninaire
in credibility and lowest in feasibility within its own criteria. Both results can be
attributed to the objective nature of the method. ALE is dominated by numerical values
which icnIU LW~zibiiy to tlhc procedure (Quade, 1975, p.16 1). Because numbers are
manipulated so extensively, and the detail required to accomplish the risk analysis
requires an enormous amount of data, the feasibility of a complete analysis is low.
Instinctively, checklists are extremely useable while not very complete because of version
control. Scenarios are strongest in their ability to adapt to the situation or circumstances,
an attribute that makes consistency difficult to maintain. And finally, questionnaires are
most complete because of their ability to survey large numbers of people with an
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unlimited range of responses and topics, but holds little credibility due to the lack of
intuitiveness of its technique.
This ability to recognize the strengths and weaknesses of a particular
methodology can be a useful tool to analysts who are developing hybrid procedures.
Ideally, an analyst could select a method that demonstrates a significant strength under
a specific criterion and combine it with another method that demonstrates an entirely
different strength to achieve a hybrid methodology that optimizes the strengths of each
method in a particular situation. The implications of designing a custom methodology
are imaginable.
b. Holistic Comparison Capability
The evaluation method presents a holistic comparison of dissimilar
methodologies - a capability not claimed by any other technique to date. The scores
achieved from the metrics by a method collectively reflect the presence of attributes in
that methodology. The comparison therefore is made between the scores for attributes,
or criteria, and represents the relative strengths or weaknesses of that method. This
means the comparison of Consistency, for example, is considering the consistency of each
methodology individually and provides a holistic view of all risk management
methodologies under evaluation.
Using a holistic view of risk management methodologies, dissimilarities
are no longer an impediment to comparison. Two examples that have presented
difficulties for comparison in the past were the use of quantitative data versus qualitative
data and risk analysis versus risk management (the former lacking a decision-making
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process, while the latter includes that process). Both of these problems are overcome by
this holistic comparison capability.
TABLE 6. Method Evaluation Results
ALE CHECKLW 9COABIO QUET1ONN&MR
CopagrENCY .65 .75 . .625
-abh -W 1000 3W 3W0
Cemalit Tea .750 .30 .000 .750
U.ADU.ffY .379 .517 .$67 5"
Em Hmd .666 .66 A .333
SimpLe .0 1.000 .250 .750
Eau o Ute .750 1.000 .750 500
Undenmmdable .400 .600 AM AM
ADAPrABILTY .625 .250 .750 .3
Potble .750 .000 1.000 1.000
hModfhl M5O MO0 MO .000
IEASIBLrY .333 .4 .694 .472
Avudiaity .333 A" 1.000 .333
Pladadifty .000 .750 .750 .750
S -e .O .222 .333 333
CON IErESS .s .255 .722 .722
SwODe A" 222 .333 -333
EMOnmt. .333 1.000 1.000
Emmt Amb .333 .00 .833 .833
VALIDrTY 444 435 M553 -"3
RIdev.q MOt .333 O .666
SOOPe A" 222 .333 .333
Pftudakz .0 .750 .750 .750
C.IEILMY .639 664 472 .7
tniymmu .777 .333 .444 222
RIieab fty MO 1.000 MO MO
55
2. Confirmation of Predictions
The real significance of this evaluation model is in the comparison of the
criteria and attributes across each methodology simultaneously. Figure 8 graphically
illustrates this comparison between methods. The most distinctive methodology for any
particular criterion can be selected by comparing the scores horizontally. Although this
may seem like a minor achievement, when the reader considers that each of the
methodologies have been evaluated by precisely the same gauge - a standard - the results
achieve a level of credibility not previously attainable. The credibility of our evaluation
model (not the criteria of credibility) is further substantiated by the general correlation of
our evaluation with the predictions (see Table 5).
As expected, of the four methods evaluated for useability, checklists ranked
the highest, whereas, questionnaires ranked the lowest. The underlying reasons for these
differences can be ascertained by a closer examination of the metrics. Checklist, with its
simple and easy to use interface, its ability to quickly and efficiently recover errors, and
its inherent understandability caused it to rank highly in useability. Questionnaire,
alternatively, is relatively simple to administer, but is not easy to use because of the
complexity introduced when questionnaires must be compiled. Questionnaire also ranked
poorly because of the difficulty in finding and correcting errors in the morass of data
received in the responses.
Another example of the metrics corresponding with the prediction is the
criterion completeness. The most complete methodology (as determined by the evaluation
method) is scenario or questionnaire while checklist rates last of the four. Although the
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Figure 8. Methodology Criteria Values
data collection is different for each of the methods, scenarios and questionnaires collect
input data which is limited only by the experience and knowledge of the participants.
Completeness is achieved by the open-ended approach to data collection (free-form
scenarios or open-ended opinion type questions). On the other hand, checklists are
closed-ended in their data collection. Input is limited to only those items contained on
the checklist. As a result, checklists tend to be incomplete.
Similar arguments could be made to explain the close correlation between the
predictions and measurements of the criteria of consistency, adaptability and validity.
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Admittedly, the converse of the above discussion is also present. Several
examples could be referenced from the results listed in Tables 5 and 6 that don't
correspond to our predictions. In fact, the criterion credibility provides a complete
contradiction to our predictions.
The purpose of analyzing our results in the context of our predictions is to
provide an approximation of the usefulness and integrity of the metrics. The strength of
the approximation is based on a preponderance of the results from the application of our
metrics correlating with the intuitive predictions. This is an indication that the metrics
are measuring, to some degree, the characteristics that we have determined to be
instrumental in a comparison process. While an incomplete correlation provides sufficient
evidence that a problem does exist, it also implies that the metrics are providing a viable
technique for discerning methodology characteristics. A perfect correlaticii oc a lack of
any correlation would have indicated that the metrics were worthless or ineffectual,
respectively.
The few results that differ significantly from the predictions in our evaluation
can be interpreted as one of four possibilities:
* The metrics are not contributing to the measurement of a particular attribute.
• There are an insufficient number of metrics to fully measure the presence of an
attribute.
" The prediction is too imprecise to provide a distinguishable subject for evaluation
by the metrics technique for that criterion.
" A combination of the problems above exists.
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Although the comparison of our evaluation results against our predictions is adequate for
approximating the usefulness and integrity of the metrics, it is scarcely an adequate
technique for determining the nature and extent of the above problems. Any conclusion
drawn from this evaluation about the problems which exist would be purely speculative.
The task of validating the metric evaluation technique is deferred to more empirical and
analytical methods and will be discussed in Chapter V.
In essence, this chapter confirms the metrics evaluation technique is providing
an acceptable, standardized measurement of a methodology's attributes upon which to
base a more sophisticated comparison of risk management tools. Additionally, it is
expected that a refinement of and additions to the metrics developed in Chapter II will
be necessary. Further discussion of this topic will be presented in Chapter V.
3. Applicability to Hybrid Methods
A feature of the metric evaluation technique that should be cmphasized
concerns the comparison of hybrid methodologies which are representative of most risk
management tools. The term hybrid is used to denote methodologies that employ a
combination of different risk management methods. Theoretically, they incorporate the
strength of each method in a complementary fashion, therefore, they would obviously rate
higher on most criteria against the generic methods we utilized. The premise to use
generic and discrete methodologies for this application of the evaluation metrics was to
insure our results were not erroneously derived from the impact of a hybrid method.
It was imperative that the application of the metrics reflected a logical basis
and relatively accurate results, as described in the previous section, before considering a
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more complex application against hybrid methods. This chapter has achieved that
requirement. Consequently, Chapter IV submits the evaluation model to one institutional
and three commercially available risk management tools which are hybrids.
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IV. A PRAGMATIC COMPARISON OF RISK MANAGEMENT TOOLS
A. INTRODUCTION
In Chapter I1, the metrics were applied to the evaluation and comparison of generic
risk management methodologies. That procedure provided a rudimentary indication that
the metrics indeed measured certain attributes, and consequently criteria, which are
considered essential to the evaluation and comparison process. However, the
methodologies examined were distinct and independent of each other. Even though the
capability to evaluate and compare individual methods is beneficial, the significance of
the metric evaluation is in its application to hybrid methodologies. Hybrid methodologies
are representative of the majority of tools that are currently available to computer security
risk managers. This chapter demonstrates the strength of the metrics evaluation technique
by evaluating and comparing a small sample of four hybrid tools. The analysis was
conducted by the authors.
1. Prerequisite Computer System Case
Unlike the comparisons made in Chapter ITI, the comparison of hybrid tools
necessitates using a tool within the context of a test case computer system. The
evaluation in Chapter III measured attributes of the methodologies (not the mechanics
involved) to determine the presence of correlations between observations and predictions.
This chapter applies the metric evaluation technique to hybrid tools for the purpose of
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determining the suitability of their use for a specific computer system configuration, by
a particular analyst/manager.
The mechanical process required by each tool is a significant part of the
evaluation. It must be performed to the extent that sufficient information has been
obtained by the evaluator to make a valid response for several of the metrics. To ensure
a consistent comparison, each tool must be provided with an identical scenario. For the
purposes of this thesis, this is accomplished by a computer system case which can provide
a consistent source of data for:
* Assets, values, and procedures.
* Relationships, configurations, and environmental circumstances.
A narrative of the computer system case used in this chapter is provided in Appendix D.
2. Disclaimer for Case System
The case system presented in Appendix D is modelled after an actual computer
system laboratory provided by the Naval Postgraduate School's (NPS) Administrative
Sciences Department. The information provided in this case system should not be
construed to represent actual conditions, procedures, or circumstances of any kind that
may exist at the Naval Postgraduate School. The laboratory was used only to provide
a framework for the development of the fictitious system in Appendix D. Additionally,
no evaluation nor statement is made or implied concerning this laboratory. The case
system is provided to ensure consistent inputs for the evaluation of the tools.
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B. RISK MANAGEMENT TOOL DESCRIPTIONS
In Chapter I, it was established that a plethora of tools exist. In fact, more than 30
automated risk analysis and risk management packages are commercially available
(Gilbert, 1989). However, the cost of these packages has prevented the purchase of any
risk management tool for this study. The prices range from $350 to $29000 (Johnson,
1987, p.36 ). The lack of travel funds and limited time available further prevented the use
of the NIST Risk Management Research Laboratory for conducting an evaluation and
comparison. Consequently, demonstration versions of three automated risk management
tools, with their accompanying documentation (which consisted mainly of advertisement
literature) were acquired. Although extremely limited in their capability to perform all
the functions provided by the actual tools, they proved to be sufficient to provide the
necessary examples upon which to base answers to the metrics. A fourth risk
management tool, a manual survey, was included in the evaluation to demonstrate that the
metrics' comparison capability is not limited exclusively to automated tools and that
dissimilar tools can be compared on an equal basis.
Each of the following sub-sections provides general background information and a
brief description of the packages utilized in this evaluation. Narrative depictions of these
tools have been written devoid of any preconceptiors introduced by advertisements
concerning the features and underlining methodology of the products. This should
provide the reader with a factual perception of the tools from which to consider the
difficulty of a comparison for suitability without metrics.
63
The order of presentation was arbitrarily selected and does not reflect any
preference or endorsement by the authors.
1. RiskPAC
RiskPAC is a software product that facilitates the application of qualitative
questionnaires and production of reports. The questionnaires are predeveloped for
categories of analysis concerns, such as physical security, personal computers,
telecommunications, and computer system applications, each of which are purchased
separately.
Regardless of the questionnaire selected, answers are selected from those
responses provided. The results of a questionnaire are stored in survey format for later
access by the user for modification or correction. RiskPAC System Manager provides a
customizing capability for questionnaires that allows a user to tailor questions to his
specific situation.
Several reports are provided that reflect a general risk category, a risk level,
and a risk description. The risk level is represented by a number between one and five
inclusively, with five being the worst case. The method of computation for the risk level
is undisclosed to the user. RiskPAC is an interactive, microcomputer based risk
assessment package. Decision, analysis is possible by weighing and scoring selective
questions.
Requirements include an IBM or compatible XT or AT and 256KB of
memory. Two diskette drives are necessary if a fixed disk drive is not available. The
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interface is menu driven. A user's manual is provided, and training is provided upon
request.
The vendor of RiskPAC is Profile Analysis Corporation, Ridgefield,
Connecticut, a subsidiary of Computer Security Limited.
2. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Security Survey
This is a manual questionnaire provided to the Automated Data Processing
(ADP) security officer or the project manager for all Automatic Information Systems
(AIS) at NPS. The survey collects and documents:
" Basic Data - Information concerning system identification, system location,
iesponsible individuals, functional purpose, data characteristics and value.
" System Description - Hardware components, operating mode, value, and software
inventories.
" Risk and Vulnerability Assessment - Countermeasure and Vulnerability
relationships.
The risk and vulnerability assessment portion of this survey implements a checklist in the
form of a questionnaire which allows the user to depart from the traditional "yes" or "no"
style of checklists to a broader range of responses.
At the completion of a category of vulnerability versus countermeasure, the
user makes a subjective evaluation of the risk for that category. Footnotes are used to
prevent ambiguous terminology, and an attached supplement provides narrative examples
of vulnerability descriptions that may be used in documenting deficiencies.
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3. RiskCale
RiskCalc is an automated package with spreadsheet-like characteristics. It has
no underlying methodology, but a shell provides the purchaser with the means to create
any risk assessment computational model that is desired. The user answers a
questionnaire which inputs asset value and probability information to the system.
Optional changes to the system variables provides an immediate "what if" capability for
determining the most cost effective safeguard.
Demonstration models are available which can be used as pre-designed
questionnaires or custom tailored to fit the users requirements through the use of the
System Manager.
Requirements include an IBM or compatible PC, XT, or AT and 512KB of
memory. A fixed disk drive is recommended but not required. The interface is menu
driven with an on-line help facility. A user's manual and a system administrator's manual
are provided. A one day, on-site training session is provided with the purchase, and a
three-day risk management course will be provided upon request.
RiskCalc was developed and is distributed by Hoffman Business Associates,
Inc., Chevy Chase, Maryland.
4. Los Alamos Vulnerability Assessment (LAVA)
LAVA is a quantitative and qualitative, automated vulnerability assessment
package with an underlining methodology that combines questionnaire, scenario and
checklist techniques. It provides identification of missing safeguards through an extensive
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group of questionnaires. The threat environment is characterized by three broad
categories:
• Natural Hazards.
* On-Site (Direct) Humans.
* Off-Site (Indirect) Humans.
LAVA stresses a group consensus approach to answer the questionnaires. The group
ideally is composed of personnel from a broad spectrum of backgrounds and expertise of
the system under analysis.
Requirements include an IBM or compatible XT or AT and 512KB of
memory. A fixed disk drive is recommended, although, not required. The interface is
free-form. A user's manual is provided; however, training at a hands-on workshop which
lasts a full week is required.
LAVA was developed and is distributed by Los Alamos National Laboratory,
Los Alamos, New Mexico.
C. EVALUATION AND COMPARISON
The evaluation was conducted by the authors for the purpose of demonstrating the
use of the metrics on hybrid tools and not to rank one tool better than another. We are
obliged to remind the reader that the results of this evaluation are based on demonstration
versions of the three commercial products, and not the complete products. This
evaluation is not intended to provide an unfair advantage to any commercial vendor nor
should it be construed as an endorsement or condemnation of the subiect tools.
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1. Procedures
The evaluation process followed four simple steps:
* Execute the demonstration program for one of the tools (in the case of the manual
survey, it was conducted as prescribed by the instructions).
" Answer all questions as accurately as possible, providing data in the context of the
case computer system.
" Upon completion of the data collection, review all reports that were available from
the demo version and accompanying literature.
" Immediately following the case study demonstration, the metric questions are
answered, and values are calculated.
As the first tool completed its entire evaluation, including the compilation of
the metrics' values, the next tool was processed through the above procedures. This
evolution continued until all four tools were evaluated. While answering the metrics,
occasionally quick reviews of pertinent portions of a demonstration were conducted to
resolve indecision concerning an answer.
The Normative Model as described in Chapter III was utilized consistently
throughout this evaluation process.
2. Performance of the Tools
It became readily apparent that the demonstration software and its
accompanying literature were sufficient to conduct this evaluation. Although RiskPac
provided a "story book" demonstration which prevented the use of data from the case
computer system, the presentation provided sufficient and explicit examples upon which
to base metric decisions. We encountered no difficulties in answering the metric questions
for any of the tools evaluated.
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The tabulated results of this evaluation are found in Appendix E and are
summarized graphically below in Figure 9. Since the focus of the effort in this chapter
is to demonstrate the application of the evaluation procedure, no attempt is made to
explain or justify a particular grade earned by a specific tool; doing so would divert the
reader's attention from the evaluation procedure.
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Figure 9. Tool Criteria Values
3. Performance of the Metrics
Discussion of the evaluation results can be focused on the three perspectives
introduced in Chapter III. Those perspectives, reiterated in the context of the evaluation
conducted in this chapter, consist of examining the results of each tool separately,
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examining the results of each tool in comparison to each other, and finally, examining the
results by comparing the suitability index of each tool.
The metric evaluation technique, demonstrated in Chapter HI, indeed measures
the criteria that describe the suitability of a risk management tool. Selecting any one of
the tools (RiskPac, LAVA, RiskCalc, or the NPS ADP Security Survey) from Figure 9,
the reader can numerically rank each of the criteria for that specific tool and determine
its strength or weakness.
One of the primary advantages of the metric evaluation technique is its ability
to compare a single criterion across several methods or tools at one time. This was aptly
demonstrated with dissimilar methodologies in Chapter HI. However, the evaluation
conducted in this chapter demonstrates the metrics' ability to discern criteria between
similar as well as dissimilar tools. As an example, examining the criterion 'completeness'
in Appendix E, shows that RiskPac is most complete, followed by LAVA, next RiskCalc,
and finally, the NPS ADP Security Survey. These results indicate that the manual survey,
when compared to three automated packages, presented no significant problem for the
evaluation, nor was there any difficulty in discerning diffcrences between the criteria of
the three automated tools.
Utilizing the Normative Model to develop a 'suitability index', a broader
perspective that includes all the criteria is possible. This technique gives equal
consideration to all the criteria (criteria weights are equal to one) and therefore, provides
a holistic ranking all of the tools. The 'suitability index' for the sample risk management
tools used in the evaluation for this chapter are presented in Figure 10.
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Although not a critical
problem for the selection of tools A S"0.......... .°........ ..................... . ......
from the samples evaluated in this "0 ...... ............. ....... .....
chapter, the 'suitability index' on I
it "0...... ..... . .. . .. . --------
some occasions may fail to 0 1 ......
0 ...... ........ ...... 1 ........ . .... .
numerically discriminate between . ...... ....... . ....... .....
tools. For instance, had the - "ft -L" .noePik aww"Tod
evaluation consisted only of Figure 10. Suitability Index
RiskPac and RiskCalc, then a decision based on the 'suitability index' would not be
possible because of equal values. As an alternative, the evaluator could resort to selecting
a tool based on a criteria comparison.
In conclusion, this chapter has demonstrated the practical use of the metrics
developed in Chapter II for evaluation and comparison of hybrid risk management tools.
Utilizing the Normative Model presented in Chapter III, the selection of the most suitable
tool has been simplified for the case computer system described in Appendix D.
Furthermore, had the need existed to make a selection based on a more discriminating
analysis, that capability was available by examining and comparing criteria values or
attribute values of particular concern.
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V. OBSERVATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
A. OBSERVATIONS
1. Metric Formulation
Making the right choice of which risk management tool from among a wide
variety of commercially available packages is difficult. The complexity of the decision
is further perplexed by the multitude of approaches used as the basis for those packages.
In this study, we utilized a systematic approach to compose a description of the suitability
of a particular risk management method by defining suitability ir- terms of its underlying
criteria. The attributes that compose a criterion were then defined and expressed in terms
of metrics. By progressively decomposing suitability into metrics, comparisons are
readily made. The comparisons facilitate making a choice of risk management tools. The
multiple criteria evaluation method was applied against four underlying methods for
conducting risk analysis to test the procedure, and then was employed to evaluate four
readily available risk management packages.
2. Multiple Criteria Evaluation Method Application
a. Risk Management Methodologies
(1) Feasibility Criterion. In making intuitive predictions about the
metric evaluation of the underlying methods in Chapter III, we came to our conclusion
that questionnaire would rank lowest amongst the methods because of the inherent
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difficulty in collecting and compiling the data provided in the questionnaires. This
underlying difficulty should have a significant negative impact on feasibility of the
questionnaire method. At the same time, the simplicity and ease of use found in the data
collection of the checklist method should make the method more feasible despite a certain
amount of difficulty associated with compiling the results into a decision. For these
reasons, our intuitive predictions for feasibility were that checklist would rank highest and
questionnaire would rank lowest. When Template 1 of Appendix C is examined,
however, it is seen that checklist ranked second (.546 compared to scenario's .694) and
questionnaire ranked third (.472 compared to quantitative's .333).
To determine the source of the discrepancy between the predictions
and the resultant values, it was evident that the metrics, as written, capture the feasibility
of only the data collection process. Our predictions, on the other hand, considered all
aspects of the process, including the collection, processing, and interpretation of the data,
pointing out that an aspect of the process was overlooked when the metrics were
generated. The question is: "Are the metrics versatile enough to incorporate the
compilation and interpretation processes with data collection?"
As test of the ability of the metrics to accommodate a modification
of the definition of a criterion, we will re-write the definition of feasibility as- "The
required data is available, and can be economically gathered, processed, and interpreted."
To measure the feasibility of all aspects of the process, the attributes of availability,
practicality, and scope remain valid as measures of data collection. The attributes of ease
of use and simplicity (as explained in Chapter Ii) are added to provide a ni-",'ure of
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processing and interpretation and a new attribute calledprocessabilily is added to measure
how readily data is processed by the method. Processability involves two metrics to
measure the ability to economically compile and interpret the collected data. The two
metrics are described as:
" "Does the process facilitate the compilation of data in a form that is useable by the
analyst and decision-maker?"
" "Is the compiled data in a form that is readily interpreted by the decision maker?"
When the one new and two previous criteria are added to the
measurement process, the results are more in keeping with the predictions made earlier;
checklist ranks highest, quantitative second, scenario third, and questionnaire lowest (see
Table 7).
TABLE 7. Feasibility Criterion for Risk Management Methods
._.__________ .. QUANTrrATIVE CHECKLIST 9CENARIO QUESTIONNAIRE
FEASIBILITY .542 .690 .513 .444
Availability .333 .666 1.000 .333
Practicality .000 .750 .750 .750
Scope .666 .222 .333 .333
Simple .500 1.000 .250 .750
Eae o Use .750 1.000 .750 .500
f .bdiy1 500 00 W00o
If the same new metrics are applied to the commercial tools
examined in Chapter IV, the NPS ADP Security Survey would move from its first ranking
in feasibility to third. All other tools would remain in their relative positions to each
other. Table 8 provides the resulting values for feasibility when the metrics are applied
as described above.
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TABLE 8. Feasibility Criterion for Risk Management Tools
........
....... . Rhkpac LAVA RlakCak NnS
F1E.AF S 1IL1TY .708 .819 .838 .704
Avaiabify .000 1.000 1.000 1.000
P aticaiy .750 .500 .500 1.000
Some 1.000 .666 .778 .778
Simpie 1.000 .750 1.000 1.000
Ewe of Use 1.000 1.000 .750 10.00
,ooeaabilfty .500 1 .000 1.000 .000
While we are not advocating wholesale modification of the criteria,
attributes or metrics, it is valuable to know that if a criterion is found to be measuring
something other that what was intended, a modification can be accomplished readily.
(2) Credibility Criterion. Probably the most interesting results of the
use of the metrics against the underlying methods was that of credibility. As a result of
the evaluation of the four risk management methods, checklist was found to have the
greatest value (.666) while questionnaire had the lowest (.367). A cursory examination
of Table 5 indicates that a complete reversal of the predictions took place in the
measurements.
Initially, we were prepared to accept the possibility that the metrics
were inappropriate (i.e. they were measuring the wrong thing), or else the metrics were
incomplete in capturing the criterion of credibility. However, upon detailed analysis of
the predictions and the measurements, we determined that a discontinuity existed in the
levels at which the two processes (prediction and metric measurement) were conducted.
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The predictions were based on an in-depth understanding of each of
the methods ultimately evaluated, albeit greatly generalized. In spite of this
understanding, our literature review and focus of understanding was oriented to the
analyst rather than the decision-maker. When making the predictions, we examined the
methods for credibility from the perspective of the user of the system.
The metrics, alternatively, were written from the perspective of the
decision-maker rather than the analyst. Intuitively, when the methods are examined from
the perspective of the decision-maker, our predictions are significantly different.
Questionnaire, because it must compile opinions from personnel with a variety of
backgrounds and knowledge, will not hold as high a degree of credibility for the decision-
maker when compared to numeric methods (quantitative), processes where the decision-
maker's opinion is included (scenario), or processes where an established routine exists
(checklist). When examined from the same perspective as the metrics, our intuitive
predictions would indicate that checklist would rank best and questionnaire would rank
lowest. These intuitive results are in consonance with the results obtained from the
metrics as presented in Template 1 of Appendix C.
The experience with credibility in our evaluation of risk analysis'
underlying methods illustrates the strength of the metric evaluation method in forcing a
consistent level of examination across all levels of the evaluation.
b. Risk Management Hybrid Tools
One of our greatest concerns as the metrics were developed was the need
for the metrics to provide enough detail in the evaluation to facilitate discrimination
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between commercial risk management packages that would share many of the same
characteristics. After an examination of the results of the evaluation conducted in Chapter
IV, we determined that there was sufficient differentiation between packages to make a
suitability determination.
In some cases, the numeric separation between packages for attributes and
criteria was negligible (as a result of the small number of metrics that comprise an
attribute). For example, is RiskPac really significantly more modifiable than the NPS
survey because it scored 1.000 to the NPS survey's .500? Possibly not, because the
difference between the two scores is a single "yes" to one metric.
However, the significance of the suitability decision is not influenced by
a small number of metrics. A clear decision can be made at the criteria or suitability
level, as long as some preselection threshold is established by the organization doing the
evaluation.
3. Multiple Criteria Evaluation Method Role
The procedure has proven to be flexible and useful. The multiple criteria
method of evaluation has demonstrated its flexibility by functioning in a predictable
manner against both risk management methods and risk management tools. Most
significantly, the multiple criteria evaluation technique described in previous chapters
provides the analyst and decision-maker with a useful tool for culling relevant information
about risk management packages. Patton describes the importance of utility in
evaluations:
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In studying the utilization of evaluation research I found that decision makers and
information users did not expect evaluation reports to produce "truth." Nor did they
treat evaluation reports as containing "truth" in any fundamental sense. Rather, they
viewed evaluation findings as additional information that they could combine with
other information.... The purpose of evaluation research, then, is to provide relevant
and useful information to decision makers.... (Patton, 1980, p.273)
The usefulness of a technique that can differentiate between similar
commermial risk management applications is momentous. An individual using this
technique to make a comparison can rest assured that the metrics provide a consistent and
logical application of the criteria to all subjects of the evaluation. Hence, a standard is
established and evaluations are dependably controlled.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Given the potential for applications of the multiple criteria evaluation technique, the
following research areas appear to be promising avenues for the future.
1. Multiple Criteria Evaluation Method Refinement
We have presented a comparison of predictions and observations in Chapter
III which provided for continued investigation. However, those results provided no
empirical data upon which to determine the validity of the metrics or the technique, nor
were they designed to validate the metrics. Further analytical studies should be conducted
to make that determination. A requirement to conduct detailed empirical and analytical
studies of the performance of the metrics under varying conditions exists to determine
their validity and modify or enhance accordingly. Wan addresses this problem:
Finally, the mathematical results obtained from our analysis will have to be
interpreted and compared with observations and empirical data available for the
modeled phenomenon. If the results from the model are not sufficiently realistic,
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we must return to the formulation phase of the process and revise the mathematical
model. Even if the results are consistent or comparable with observations, we may
still want to revise the model and make it more sophisticated by incorporating more
questions or more influencing factors. This interpretative phase of the process is
sometimes called 'model evaluation' or 'model validation.' (Wan, 1989. p.2 )
Another aspect of ensuring the validity of the results reported in this thesis is
to perform the evaluation technique using a different evaluation team in an attempt to
replicate our results against these and other packages. While different circumstances
would produce different scores and rankings than we derived (as is expected with
differing evaluation teams), the same amount of differentiation between packages should
exist in the results of other researchers. Further research is also necessary to develop
additional criteria, attributes, and metrics to improve the differentiation between evaluated
packages.
The step-by-step process of performing the evaluation technique lends itself
to automation. After the technique has been validated through further experimentation,
investigation into automation should be considered. With simple macros on a spreadsheet
program, the multiple criteria evaluation method could provide a microcomputer
implementation that would provide the following benefits:
" The answers to repetitive metrics would have to be provided only once.
• A choice of mathematical models (normative relationship, significance coefficients,
or metric utility) that automate computations could be made easily available.
" Statistical inferences from the scores could be prepared and repor+x1 automatically.
* Textual and graphic reports could be generated automatically.
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2. Extrapolation of Metrics Approach
The risk management
process has three necessary
components as depicted in Figure
11. The multiple criteria Method Manager
evaluation method presented in
this thesis provides a technique for
ensuring that the risk management System
Figure 11. Risk Management Environment
method is suitable. The risk
management team of the organization making the evaluation and the system to be
evaluated also play an important role in this environment.
Figure 11 illustrates the triad of elements that comprise the components of risk
management. This thesis has introduced and justified the use of metrics to determine the
suitability of the methods involved with the risk management process. The other two
components, the risk management team and the computer system itself, could also be
evaluated utilizing the same multiple criteria techniques introduced in this thesis.
Risk management teams, consisting of analysts and managers, all have varying
degrees of competence. Metrics should be developed to measure the competence of the
participating team to identify its weaknesses to ensure that the risk management method
selected compliments those weaknesses.
At the same time, every system that the risk management team and methods
will be employed against will differ in complexity. The computer system could be
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quickly evaluated with metrics designed to measure the level of complexity involved in
the system.
A risk management method or tool is evaluated for its suitability for and
organization's goals and objectives. In the same way, the management team should be
evaluated for its competence and the system should be evaluated for its complexity.
Together, the three components produce a balance which provides a complete picture of
the risk management process for an organization.
3. Optimal Risk Management Method Development
Chapter I discussed the implications of our research regarding the development
of an optimal risk management method. After a thorough review of the metrics,
attributes, and criteria, we feel that a "best" risk management technique cannot be
developed that will satisfy the needs of all organizations. Through the consideration of
all aspects of risk management (the method, the management team, and the system) with
an evaluation technique similar to the multiple criteria evaluation, satisfaction of a
particular organizational need can be fulfilled. Additional research that examines risk
management from a holistic viewpoint may be able to classify existing risk management
tools to make general categorical statements of their capabilities. For instance, a
particular risk management tool might fulfill the needs of a particular group of
organizations. An organization's search and comparisons for a suitable tool would be
greatly simplified if the comparison were limited to a small sample that was selected from
a category of tools determined to be most likely to fulfill their requirements.
81
C. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has established a standardized set of metrics in a structured relationship
which can be used to evaluate risk management methodologies and tools for their
suitability in a given organizational situation. The metrics were successfully applied to
four computer security risk management methodologies to develop an informal validation.
Finally, the metrics were used to evaluate four hybrid computer security risk management
tools as a test of the multiple criteria evaluation method and to demonstrate its use. Its
versatility was exemplified by the use of dissimiliar tools. Several suggestions for
extension of the concepts developed in this thesis have been provided to guide future
research.
There is an ongoing effort by the participants in the Risk Management Model
Builder's Workshops to identify the elements and relationships associated with risk
management as well as a continued effort to develop automated and manual tools to
implement their ideas. As a result, there is a growing need for a consistent and reliable
method to evaluate the tools to find the one that best suits the requirements of the
enterprise. The multiple criteria evaluation technique described in this thesis can fulfill
that need and provide a deeper understanding of the risk management process. The
challenge for the future is to exploit that understanding to improve the process in all
organizations concerned with computer security risk management.
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APPENDIX A. EVALUATION METRICS
TEMPLATE 1
CRITERION: CONSISTENCY (CI)
Reiaiit A, 1 oe heprcsspovdeamehnim oreue heitrdc3o
IEMPLAIE 2
CRITERION: USEABILITY (C.)
Errr anlin ( 2 . ane cde etioshbrily itdgtfed ee? )
3. Is the proem dciiate wel adefin (ife dsathe enrerom
4. Istpecal ta insnis t rie d innfcat) t acrc
ERRRMANLIN Aibis Value (A,]l-n 24=,.1nlI
aSeofple (A) 1. Ansexerat knowlede ae o reire t pea)h
3rs. tepoeswl srcueMn)oiclysqeta m
4. Ar te orme atonshp equgated r the user lvn? Wm)
2. Is the proem domrhnildefi? (i.s pobe
3.unred? thWemj nmiuosydfnd m
4. Srec tratinsipgs betweqen .lmsepane we
Ease of Ue (A ph1ss o therastiansdie inerac?)
5. Ar oe deirion podsearly ientified? frm)mter.
3.Isth poe1s we ll strctre aloaly seqental (,m~si)/
Metrc Vlue EASEJT Metricoiut Value = (A)A+.j/4m+,+,/
Undrsanabe A, 1 I te u ly pemseexlane?84 l
'rEMOPLA'rE 3
CRflERION: ADAPTABILITY (C)
Portfabiity (A) 1. ane poe vale reapied byos the ed n choniginlions
fominm ii) ir) m
2. ae pratos segmentied byos prdestinl partos
Metric Valu ADAPTABILTMetr VAkriu (CV alue )2
Moifablty(A . reipu vlesreaie b temeho n her85gia
TEMPLATE 4
CRITERION: FEASIBILITY (C4)
Availabil 4. D(steAeh) nlz all expertw re aspecires oo the sysdiien ote
(m4) o? m,
5s ldatsrdo the method anlyea tm setso the oygeni? (iort?
Pracicaity Ad 6. Does the method alinatat the ei al aiet of hese?
(m4)
7. Does the proesso abye acmlisei ae t ofailahe? stM
Meri Vlu EAI~lIY eRic al Y (C4): e ValueA2+A,3)=(,t+n+
Scpe(A 1 s heamut f eti i te roes se slctb86 n
TEMPLATE 5
CRITRION: COMPLETENESS (C5)
Scope ~ Doe1. s the mthofdaaetall ta prets oster selete? 00
6. Does the method analyzeeal at heleal esiorte sysem
3. Does the method analyze all personne aspects Of the system?
8. Does the method analyze all communatin aspects of thetmME
Elemnts A) 5. Does the method comprze len sivecnsde ssem? n
2. Does the method anamprehesive dr thpeto ahe sts? n'
4. Does the method comprzehal enslonesdet safearst?(i)
5. Does the mnethod comalhsie l couions vuspertsbOfte?
Elysten? Attlb .. A. ase vaue cosd.d (in...1) ...
3. Ds the metrabiaitylofe thea environehatcontdeed (inte
Elements (A 4. Is afeuard ecomhniveles consider assets
5. Is the metyhof acomesvl consider (heai aets)(
6. Ds the iehod copreabnlity oer urreo tret(m
even osidhermetd? cnide ucms n.)
LEMENT AttribUte Value (A,).{rn1 +nslis+a. tN+r.)/6 X
Elmet alue C1. Y~NS Arei Vse alues(Cc)nsidered? 2 +Aml)
uts . S heptecyofa hrataen cnsdeed87 n
TEMPLATE 6
CRITERION: VALIDITY (Cd
3. Doe the meut aetho n ye all haidwareaset of te sym
4. Does the mroeo anlye maed freasemets or thegusyiste?
(in)
5cp 4 . Ds the methofdaaetal t pes oter slte? () ~
6. Does the method aonlyzeeal at helel a spe (on
7. Does the method analyze all personnel aspects of the system?
(M7)
8. Does the method analyze all softwarein aspects of thetm
Praticliy () 5. Does the methodanlz allinu data asto th inyasare (m) %s
6. ~ ~ RCICLI Does~~ thVmthdlnay e th(roeual aspects ofthe
Metricysem Vau VLDIT ercVle()( 1 A+ 3
7.Dosth eto aayz llprsnelapet o h88stm
TEMPLATE 7
CRITERION: CREDIBILITY (C7)
Intuitiveness (A,) 1. Does the method delineate the relationships between the
elements? On)
2. Does the output have a perceivable relationship with the
input? (m)
3. Does the method analyze all hardware aspects of the
system? (
4. Does the method analyze all software aspects of the
system? (n,)
5. Does the method analyze all data aspects of the system?
6. Does the method analyze the procedural aspects of the
system? (j..
7. Does the method analyze all personnel aspects of the
system? (W7)
8. Does the method analyze all communications aspects of
the system? (Wd
9. Does the system analyze the environment that the
system resides in? (ma)
BN'rUMIVENISS Auke Value
Reliability (A) 1. Does the process provide a mechanism to reduce the
introduction of personal bias? (m, )
2. Does the method provide a mechanism that reduces the
impact of uncertainty. O=)
RELIABILITY Atibuse Value (A)=(ah*m%12I
Metric Value CREDIBILITY Metric Value (C7) (A,+A 2}/2
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APPENDIX C. METHOD EVALUATION WORKSHEETS
TMEPLATE I
....... . ALZ CHBIPLWB SC4AR1O QU~FIOM4A=R
corallyocy A625 .756 A26.25
Relibiliy 500 1.000 500 300
Camint Term .750 50 .0 .750
USBA3ILMY .579 .817 .567 .4
Enor H=Wcdha O A" AM 333
Simpe00 LOW0 .250 .750
Ewae Ofuse .750 1.000 .750 500
Usdermmkbie .40D .600 .60 .600
ADATArnrTY A25 .291 .736 00
Ponable .750 .000 1.000 1.000
bladiffiable 3w0 300 50 OOD
PEAS13ILflY .333 .54 A94 A472
Availability -333 .666 1.000 .333
Paaity .000 .750 .750 .750
some /MO -22 333 333
CONWIZTE .50 .195 .722 .722
sowe .666 .22.333 .333
Ekown 500 -333 1.000 1.00
Mement Aurgu .333 O0O0 .833 .833
VALIIDITY A"4 A435 3113 .5W
televuby A" .333 .666 A"0
ScOpe .66 .2M .333 .333
Prsdilky .000 .750 .750 .75
CRH)IUILIY A39 A66 A72 %37
bu~kvmee .777 .333 644 .222
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APPENDIX D. CASE SYSTEM
A. PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
The subject system (patterned after a Naval Postgraduate School microcomputer
network laboratory) is located on federal property whose access is controlled at night and
over weekends. The laboratory is located on the second floor of a building that remains
unlocked 24 hours a day. All elements of the system are located in a single room to the
building, secured by a single solid core door with a metal frame. Access to the lab is
controlled by a mechanical cipher lock.
The room size measures approximately 30 feet by 25 feet, the walls are standard
gypsum plaster construction. The floor is carpeted wall to wall. There are no windows
in the room, ventilation is provided by a single air conditio, ing duct sourced in the
building's central air conditioner. Illumination is provided by double florescent ceiling
lights.
Electrical power for the laboratory is provided by standard building power.
Sufficient circuits are provided to avoid overloads. Surge and spike protection is provided
for each suite of computers.
Each computer and its monitor are anchored physically to a desk. The detachable




The microcomputer network laboratory is comprised of three individual
networks (3Comm Ethernet, IBM Token Ring, and Appletalk). There are 26 personal
computers and seven Macintosh Pluses all of which are located inside the lab. Two IBM
clones and one Macintosh are used as servers for their respective networks. The servers
are write protected and keyboard locked. Six of the PC suites are equipped with 1200
baud modems each attached to a standard telephone line. Dial-in to the network is not
available. There are three printers, two IBM Graphics Printers and one Apple Lazerwriter
II. Total value of the hardware associated with this laboratory (including the network
boards and network operating system) is approximately $62,000.
2. Software
The laboratory is used for instructional purposes during classroom hours,
however, the lab is also made available as a computing facility when classes are not in
session. To make the lab more useful to the student population in general, several
software packages are provided to furnish basic applications. Consequently, network
versions of word processing, spreadsheet, and database applications have been placed on
the server. Total value of the software associated with this lab is $1715.
C. LABORATORY MANAGEMENT AND PROCEDURES
The stated purpose of the laboratory is to provide instructional microcomputer
facilities to support curriculum requirements and to provide word processing, database,
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and spreadsheet application services to authorized students. A laboratory policy has been
written and is enforced by a part-time lab manager (he is also an instructor). The cipher
lock combination is changed approximately every six months, and access to the
combination is loosely controlled.
Personnel that utilize the laboratory vary in microcomputer experience from
complete novices to experts with years of e- -rience.
On-line virus checks are requested of the user prior to conducting any processing
to avoid system infection by user provided software, and individual suite fixed disks are
purged of unauthorized files on a monthly basis.
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APPENDIX E. TOOL EVALUATION WORKSHEETS
TEMOPIATE 1
RJkPa LAVA Rhcak N'4S
com'u1ENcy .375 .875 A625 .751
Raiabghy AM0 1.0000 5003
Caimm TOMi .750 .750 .750 1.600
1SAInxT 66 A36 .736 .817
Erro Huidhag L666 1.000 A.066
Siwpk 1.000 .750 1.000 1.000
EaftofUse LOW0 1.000 .750 1.000
UadwudawWble ODD0 AM0 200 .60
AIDAFABILflt IA"8 A25 A625 750
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